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Ruminative thinking is believed to exacerbate the psychological distress that follows stressful life events.
An experience-sampling study was conducted in which participants recorded negative life events, ru-
minative self-focus, and negative affect eight times daily over one week. Occasions when participants
reported a negative event were marked by higher levels of negative affect. Additionally, negative events
were prospectively associated with higher levels of negative affect at the next sampling occasion, and
this relationship was partially mediated by momentary ruminative self-focus. Depressive symptoms
were associated with more frequent negative events, but not with increased reactivity to negative events.
Trait rumination was associated with reports of more severe negative events and increased reactivity to
negative events. These results suggest that the extent to which a person engages in ruminative self-focus
after everyday stressors is an important determinant of the degree of distress experienced after such
events. Further, dispositional measures of rumination predict mood reactivity to everyday stressors in
a non-clinical sample.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd.Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Dysfunctional mood regulation has been highlighted as a key
factor in the onset and maintenance of psychological distress.
Particular interest has centred on rumination, deﬁned by Nolen-
Hoeksema (1991, p. 569) as ‘‘repetitively focusing on the fact that
one is depressed; on one’s symptoms of depression; and on the
causes, meanings, and consequences of depressive symptoms’’.
According to response styles theory (RST), a ruminative response
style prolongs sad mood relative to engagement in pleasant,
distracting activities (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000). Considerable
evidence suggests that dysphoric rumination exacerbates negative
mood and negative cognition (see Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004;
Watkins, 2008).
A related line of investigation addresses how rumination in-
ﬂuences emotional reactions to stressful life events. Controlling
initial levels of depression, a ruminative response style predicts
future depressive symptoms in response to events such as the Lomo
Prieta earthquake (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) or the death
of a loved one (Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). Similarly,
Robinson and Alloy (2003) reported that rumination on negative
inferences after stressful events (stress-reactive rumination)oberly), e.r.watkins@ex.ac.uk
Y license.interacted with dysfunctional attitudes and negative attributional
style to predict new depressive episodes among students.
Despite a large body of research suggesting that stressful life
events are associated with short-term increases in negative affect
(Marco & Suls, 1993; Suls, Green, & Hillis, 1998; Swendson, 1998),
little is known about the role of rumination in this process. Thus,
the ﬁrst aim of this study was to address how negative affect
ﬂuctuates after everyday stressors, and whether levels of momen-
tary ruminative self-focus mediate this relationship. The second
aim was to investigate whether individuals who report high levels
of trait rumination (high ruminators) show greater reactivity to
negative life events than low ruminators.
Many studies examining the inﬂuence of rumination on
reactivity to stressful events have used retrospective assessments
that may not accurately reﬂect how individuals responded shortly
after the stressful event (Stone et al., 1998). Daily diary designs
represent an improvement in this regard (e.g., Wood, Saltzberg,
Neale, Stone, & Rachmiel, 1990), but often require that reports of
response styles are made several hours after their occurrence,
increasing the probability of retrospective bias.
In experience-sampling methodology (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi &
Larson, 1987) studies, the participant provides ‘online’ data about
experience as prompted by an alarm signal. Retrospective bias is
thus virtually eliminated, although ESM remains susceptible to
other response biases that are inherent in self-report measures
(Stone et al., 1998). Furthermore, ESM can track ﬂuctuations in af-
fect and ruminative self-focus over relatively short temporal
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which the participant may be unaware.
Peeters, Nicolson, Berkhof, Delespaul, and deVries (2003) used
ESM to investigate the effect of positive and negative life events on
mood among depressed individuals and non-depressed controls.
Although negative events were associated with increased negative
affect in both groups, depressed participants were less reactive to
negative events than non-depressed participants. Swendson (1998)
similarly found that negative events were associated with negative
affect among undergraduates, but this relationship was not mod-
erated by depressive symptomatology.
Given that rumination is normally conceptualized as a response
to negativemood, onemight expect rumination tomoderate and/or
mediate the impact of distressing events on psychological distress.
In an ESM study of adolescents, Silk, Steinberg, and Morris (2003)
found that the use of involuntary engagement strategies (including
rumination) after negative events was associated with greater
sadness and anger at a subsequent occasion, and that higher levels
of involuntary engagement over the week were associated with
more depressive symptoms. Unfortunately, this study did not
uniquely address ruminative thinking.
We conducted an ESM study in which adults reported their
negative affect, ruminative self-focus, and negative events eight
times daily for one week. On each occasion, we measured mo-
mentary negative affect as a composite of sadness, anxiety, and
irritation ratings, on the basis that rumination is associated with
each of these affects (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema,
2000; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Participants indicated on
each occasion whether or not they had experienced a recent neg-
ative event, provided a brief description of this event, and indicated
how emotionally distressing it was.
We assessedmomentary ruminative self-focus using a two-item
measure comprising the extent towhich people were focused on (i)
their feelings and (ii) their problems. The ﬁrst item corresponds to
the facet of Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) deﬁnition involving focus on
depressive feelings. The second item corresponds to the facet of
Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) deﬁnition implicating focus on causes
and consequences of depression. Focus on problems matches
discrepancy-based accounts suggesting that unresolved problems
underlie rumination (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999;
Martin & Tesser, 1996).
We hypothesised that negative affect would be associated with
(i) negative events that were reported concurrently and (ii) prior
negative events that were reported at the previous occasion. Sec-
ond, we hypothesized that negative affect would be predicted by
momentary ruminative self-focus at the previous occasion. Third,
because emotionally negative events tend to induce ruminative
self-focus (Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990), we hypothesized
that ruminative self-focus would partially mediate the association
between prior negative events and negative affect. Fourth,
informed by RST, we hypothesised that trait rumination would
moderate the association between negative events and negative
affect such that high trait ruminators would report more negative
affect after negative events than low trait ruminators. However, on
the basis of previous ﬁndings, we did not expect levels of
depressive symptomatology to moderate the association between
negative events and negative affect.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of Exeter and
the local area using e-mails and newspaper advertisements. We
requested volunteers for a study on sad moods and depression,
although we made it clear that participants did not have to bedepressed to take part. Thus, as intended, we obtained a sample
with awide range of depressive symptomatology as assessed on the
Beck Depression Inventory-II (range¼ 0–37, M¼ 15.4, SD¼ 9.2).
One hundred and thirty-nine persons (100 women) initially
consented to take part (range¼ 18–67 years, M¼ 26.8, SD¼ 13.3).
Most (107) were university students, the remainder were com-
munity adults. Data from a subset of these participants examining
the direct relationship between negative affect and ruminative
self-focus were previously reported by Moberly and Watkins
(2008). Participants were paid £10 ($20) for completing the
study.
Measures
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II)
The BDI-II assesses levels of depressive symptomatologywith 21
items that are rated on a scale from 0 to 3, with higher scores
reﬂectingmore depressive symptoms (range¼ 0–63) (Beck, Steer, &
Brown, 1996). Cronbach’s alpha for our sample was 0.90.
Response Styles Questionnaire–Ruminative Responses Scale (RSQ)
The RSQ assesses the extent to which individuals respond to
depressed mood by focusing on self, symptoms and on the causes
and consequences of their mood (trait rumination), using 22 items
rated on a 4-point frequency scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
1991). Cronbach’s alpha for our sample was 0.91.
Procedure
Weused ESM to assess negative affect, ruminative self-focus and
negative events eight times daily over seven days. Participants
rated their moods and thinking styles when signalled by an alarm
from a wrist-worn actiwatch (Cambridge Neurotechnology Ltd.,
Cambridge, UK). Each participant’s day was divided into eight equal
periods so that one alarm occurred at a random time within each
period, and no two alarms occurred within 15 min. We sampled
eight times daily to capture a range of psychological states across
sufﬁcient time points to enable sensitivity to changes in time and
setting, without over-burdening the participant, as typical of sim-
ilar experience-sampling studies (Marco & Suls, 1993). This resulted
in a 12 hr daily sampling period with one alarm occurring within
each of eight 90 min periods (e.g., 10.00–22.00). Times were
individually randomised for each participant to suit their typical
waking hours (actual range¼ 07.00–23.59).
At each alarm, a ﬂashing letter on an LED display prompted
participants to enter a rating for the moment before the alarm
sounded, by pressing a button on the actiwatch to cycle through
ratings from 1 to 7. After each rating was entered, the next letter
was displayed and the participant made the next rating. The acti-
watch only accepted entries within 20 s of each alarm, ensuring all
data were entered promptly. Participants recorded their levels of
sadness (S), anxiety (N), and irritation (I), and the extent to which
they were focusing on their feelings (F) and focusing on their
problems (P) on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
During the study, participants carried a card on their person to
remind them of the meaning of these prompts.
Participants received separate booklets for each day of the study.
Each booklet included eight experience-sampling forms, each of
which corresponded to an actiwatch alarm. Spaces were provided
for participants to record (a) time and date of form completion, and
(b) elapsed time since the alarm. Printed below was the question:
‘Since the last beep, have you experienced an event that made you feel
negative emotions?’, which participants answered by circling either
‘Yes’ or ‘No’ and writing down a brief description of the event if it
occurred. Scales were provided on which participants could rate
the extent to which they felt sad, anxious, and irritable when the
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amine persisting effects of negative events, we identiﬁed negative
events as prior when the previous ESM report on the same day
(time t 1) mentioned a negative event.
At an initial brieﬁng session, participants completed baseline
measures of trait rumination and depressive symptoms. Next,
participants were shown the actiwatch and experience-sampling
forms, and participants practised responding to a hypothetical
alarm. We emphasised that the actiwatch questions referred to the
moment just before the alarm sounded. The participant then chose
the beginning and end of the sampling period, and this information
was used to conﬁgure the actiwatch. After the sampling week,
participants returned the actiwatch and forms to the laboratory,
before being paid and debriefed.Treatment of experience-sampling data
Data were excluded from twenty-two participants who with-
drew from the study during the week of experience-sampling
(n¼ 13, ESM was too time-consuming; n¼ 5, actiwatch malfunc-
tioned; n¼ 1, illness; n¼ 1, family emergency; n¼ 1, experienced
mood recording as upsetting; n¼ 1, ESM interfered with therapy).
Data were also excluded for occasions when the participant failed
to complete the watch and form ratings within 15 minutes. Timely
completion of the experience-sampling forms was veriﬁed with
reference to (i) the reported time of form completion and (ii) the
reported time interval between the actiwatch signal and form
completion. Following standard guidelines (Delespaul, 1995), 11
participants who responded to less than one-third of the alarms
within 15 min were excluded from the analysis. These non-com-
pleters did not differ signiﬁcantly from completers on BDI-II score,
RSQ score, gender or age.
Data from 106 participants (78 women) were analysed (age
range¼ 18–67 years, M¼ 25.7 years, SD¼ 12.7)1 The mean re-
sponse rate to the actiwatch alarms was 82.6% (SD¼ 10.9%) and the
mean completion rate for the experience-sampling forms was
63.4% (SD¼ 15.4%). The total number of occasions that were validly
recorded and analysed was 3775.
We calculated a composite measure of momentary negative
affect by standardizing each of the sad, anxious, and irritated rat-
ings and summing the resulting z-scores (a¼ 0.70). We calculated
a composite measure of momentary ruminative self-focus by
standardizing the focus on feelings and focus on problems ratings
and summing the resulting z-scores (a¼ 0.67).2 Neither the RSQ brooding (a¼ 0.72) nor the reﬂective pondering (a¼ 0.74)
subscale scores (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) were signiﬁcantlyMultilevel modelling
In our data structure, occasions (Level 1) were nested within
days (Level 2) and within persons (Level 3). We used hierarchical
linear modelling to investigate the relationships within and
between different levels without violating assumptions of
independence (Snijders & Bosker, 1999), using MLwiN v.2.02 soft-
ware to conduct our analyses (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & Prosser,
2005).
Our main analysis examined the concurrent and prospective
association between negative events (recorded at time t and prior
time t 1) and negative affect (recorded at time t). To do this, we
constructed a multilevel model using a subset of the dataset (2459
occasions) for which two subsequent occasions were recorded. We
did not include a lagged measure of negative affect (recorded at
time t 1) because it was highly likely to be correlated with the1 The small number of males resulted in low statistical power to detect gender
effects and so we did not include this variable in our analyses.random parts of the multilevel model, thereby violating a key
modelling assumption (Spencer, 2002).
In our model, the intercept was speciﬁed as randomly varying at
both the day and person levels, reﬂecting the fact that observations
tend to be more similar if they are (a) taken on the same day, and
(b) taken from the same person. All occasion-level predictors were
modelled with coefﬁcients that were randomly varying at the
person level, to allow the relationship between negative events,
ruminative self-focus, and negative affect to vary between
individuals.
Trait dispositional variables and momentary ratings of rumi-
native self-focus were entered as continuous explanatory variables
centred on the grand mean. Linear and quadratic variables for time
of day (measured in days and centred on the mean sampling time,
15:04) and linear variables for day of study (centred on day 4) were
also included as covariates.Results
Negative events
Participants recorded 652 negative events. Using pre-estab-
lished criteria (Peeters et al., 2003), the ﬁrst author categorised
each event as external if it had been prompted by a past event or
situation that occurred outside the person, or internal if it had not.
Internal events included unprompted thoughts, ruminations, and
worries. A ﬁnal-year psychology undergraduate independently
categorised all negative events, yielding 93% category agreement
with the ﬁrst coder, k¼ 0.77. Remaining differences were resolved
through discussion. This process identiﬁed 128 internal events
(19.6%). Results were similar whether or not internal events were
excluded, and so results including all events are reported.
Negative event frequency was signiﬁcantly correlated with BDI-
II score, r(106)¼ 0.24, p¼ 0.01, but not with RSQ score,
r(106)¼ 0.12, p¼ 0.24. Mean negative event severity (calculated by
standardizing and summing the event-speciﬁc ratings of sadness,
anxiety and irritation) correlated positively with BDI-II score,
r(93)¼ 0.32, p< 0.01, and RSQ score, r(93)¼ 0.42, p< 0.001. RSQ
score was associated with negative event severity when controlling
BDI-II score, r(90)¼ 0.29, p< 0.01, but BDI-II score was not associ-
ated with negative event severity when controlling RSQ score,
r(90)¼ 0.08, ns.2 Negative event frequency and mean negative
event severity were not signiﬁcantly correlated, r(93)¼0.06, ns.Negative events and concurrent negative affect
We ﬁrst modelled negative affect with linear and quadratic
effects of time and linear effects of day to control for temporal
variation in negative affect and reduce the autocorrelation between
successive observations. Therewas a signiﬁcant linear effect of time
on negative affect, B¼0.787, SE¼ 0.368, p< 0.05, such that
negative affect tended to decrease over the course of the day. No
other ﬁxed effects were signiﬁcant. Inclusion of the time and day
variables resulted in a signiﬁcant improvement in model ﬁt over
the null model, change in log-likelihood c2(8)¼ 51.41, p< 0.001.
Subsequently, to account for individual differences inmean levels
of negative affect, we simultaneously added the person-level vari-
ables of depressive symptomatology and trait rumination. Bothassociated with negative event frequency. Brooding was associated with negative
event severity, r(93)¼ 0.36, p< 0.001, but reﬂection was not, r(93)¼ 0.12, ns.
Brooding was signiﬁcantly associated with negative event severity after controlling
for BDI-II score, r(90)¼ 0.24, p< 0.02.
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mination (B¼ 0.039, SE¼ 0.013, p< 0.01)were associatedwithmean
levels of negative affect. The addition of these variables resulted in
a signiﬁcant improvement in model ﬁt, c2(2)¼ 48.55, p< 0.001.3
To test our ﬁrst hypothesis that negative events would be
positively associated with negative affect at the contemporaneous
sampling occasion (time t), we entered a dichotomous variable
indicating whether or not participants reported a negative event at
time t. In the same step, we entered negative event frequency and
its interaction with negative events, to test whether negative affect
was associated with negative event frequency and whether in-
dividuals who reported more frequent negative events would be
more or less reactive to such events. As hypothesized, negative
events reported at time t were associated with higher levels of
concurrent negative affect at time t, B¼ 2.202, SE¼ 0.469,
p< 0.001. Frequency of negative event reports was unrelated to
mean levels of negative affect, B¼ 0.952, SE¼ 0.674, ns. Negative
events interacted signiﬁcantly with negative event frequency to
predict negative affect, B¼1.956, SE¼ 0.977, p< 0.05, indicating
that individuals reporting more frequent negative events were less
reactive to these events than individuals reporting less frequent
negative events. Inclusion of these terms resulted in a signiﬁcantly
improved model ﬁt, c2(21)¼ 236.53, p< 0.001.4 Although the dynamic, inter-correlated nature of our variables suggest that
a mediating (rather than moderator) role for ruminative self-focus is most appro-
priate, we also tested the interaction between prior negative events and prior ru-
minative self-focus in a subsequent step, but the coefﬁcient was not signiﬁcant,
B¼0.038, SE¼ 0.049, ns, and its inclusion did not signiﬁcantly improve model ﬁt,
c2(1)¼ 0.55, ns.
5 When RSQ brooding and reﬂective pondering subscale scores were enteredNegative events and prospective negative affect
In the next step, we tested our hypotheses that negative events
and ruminative self-focus at the previous sampling occasion (time
t 1) would each predict negative affect at the subsequent occasion
(time t). We entered a dichotomous variable indicating whether or
not a prior negative event had been reported at time t 1 and
a continuous variable representing prior momentary ruminative
self-focus at time t 1. The report of a prior negative event at time
t 1 was associated with higher levels of negative affect at time t,
B¼ 0.447, SE¼ 0.111, p< 0.001. Higher levels of prior ruminative
self-focus at time t 1 were also associated with higher levels of
negative affect at time t, B¼ 0.152, SE¼ 0.029, p< 0.001. The in-
clusion of prior negative events and prior ruminative self-focus
signiﬁcantly improved the model ﬁt, c2(13)¼ 100.83, p< 0.001.
We next tested the hypothesis that prior momentary ruminative
self-focus mediated the prospective effect of prior negative events
on negative affect (Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, we tested the path
from the initial variable to the putative mediator, by constructing
a model with prior ruminative self-focus as the criterion variable.
This revealed that prior negative events predicted prior ruminative
self-focus, B¼ 0.836, SE¼ 0.102, p< 0.001. Second, we tested the
direct path from the initial variable to the criterion variable in the
absence of the mediator. Prior negative events predicted negative
affect when ruminative self-focus was not included in the model,
B¼ 0.580, SE¼ 0.110, p< 0.001. Third, as shown earlier, the
mediator predicted the outcome variable: prior ruminative self-
focus was signiﬁcantly associated with negative affect. Fourth, the
relationship between the initial variable and the outcome variable
was reduced when the mediator was included: the magnitude of
the prior negative event coefﬁcient reduced from 0.836 to 0.447
when prior ruminative self-focus was included (see previous
analysis of the association between prior negative events at time t –
1 and levels of negative affect at time t). Conditions for partial
mediation were met (Sobel test, z¼ 4.44, p< 0.001).3 When the RSQ brooding and reﬂective pondering subscales were substituted
for the total score, brooding was associated with higher mean levels of negative
affect, B¼ 0.147, SE¼ 0.048, p< 0.01, as was depressive symptomatology, B¼ 0.538,
SE¼ 0.117, p< 0.001. Reﬂective pondering was not signiﬁcantly associated with
mean levels of negative affect, B¼0.019, SE¼ 0.040, ns.For multilevel models with lower-level path coefﬁcients that
vary randomly at a higher level, Kenny, Korchmaros, and Bolger
(2003) warn that calculation of the indirect path must consider the
covariance between the higher-level random effects. Using their
procedure, in which OLS estimates for the indirect paths are cal-
culated for each person, we estimated the covariance between the
person-level random effects to be 0.03. Because this covariance and
the path coefﬁcients for the indirect path were positive, our prior
calculation of the indirect effect was an underestimate: 26% (rather
than 22%, according to the standard approach) of the total effect of
prior negative events on negative affect was mediated by prior
ruminative self-focus.4
In a ﬁnal step, we tested the hypothesis that trait rumination
would moderate the impact of negative events on negative affect,
but depressive symptomatology would not. To do this, we si-
multaneously included cross-level interactions between each of
the person-level variables (BDI-II and RSQ) and (i) negative
events (time t) and (ii) prior negative events (time t 1). Co-
efﬁcients for this ﬁnal model are shown in Table 1. The in-
teraction between trait rumination and negative events (time t)
was associated with negative affect, but no other interaction was
signiﬁcant. Consistent with RST, high ruminators experienced
greater negative affect after negative events than low ruminators
(at time t; see Fig. 1). The interactions between depressive
symptomatology and negative events were not signiﬁcantly as-
sociated with negative affect. Inclusion of all interactions resul-
ted in a signiﬁcant improvement in model ﬁt, c2(4)¼ 14.01,
p< 0.01.5
When internal negative events were excluded, the interaction
between depressive sympatomatology and prior negative events
became statistically signiﬁcant, B¼0.228, SD¼ 0.115, p< 0.05,
such that persons reporting more depressive symptomatology
were less reactive to prior negative events. All other signiﬁcant
ﬁndings remained unchanged.
Discussion
Our ﬁnding of an association between negative events and
negative affect replicates the results of other diary and experience-
sampling studies (Marco & Suls, 1993; Peeters et al., 2003;
Swendson, 1998). Although we found that prior negative events
predicted negative mood up to three hours later, evidence from
other ESM studies has been inconsistent. Marco and Suls (1993)
failed to ﬁnd any effect on mood of prior negative events occurring
on average 90 minutes previously, while Peeters et al. (2003) found
that prior negative events were associated with negative affect for
individuals in a major depressive episode but not for non-de-
pressed individuals. By contrast, van Eck, Nicolson, and Berkhof
(1998) found that prior stressful events were associated with in-
creased negative affect in community adults. Differences in the
operationalization of negative events may account for these di-
vergent ﬁndings.instead of the RSQ total score, brooding interacted signiﬁcantly with both negative
events, B¼ 0.186, SE¼ 0.051, p< 0.001, and prior negative events, B¼ 0.082, SE¼ 0.
042, p< 0.05, indicating that negative events were more strongly predictive of
negative affect for brooders. The only other signiﬁcant cross-level interaction was
that prior negative events were less strongly associated with negative affect for
individuals who reported greater depressive symptomatology, B¼0.240, SD¼ 0.
108, p< 0.05.
Table 1
Fixed effects estimates for negative affect
Predictor Coefﬁcient (SE)
Person-level variables
BDI-II 0.431 (0.124)**
RSQ 0.031 (0.012)*
NEP 0.473 (0.640)
Momentary variables
NE 2.111 (0.422)***
PNE 0.472 (0.111)***
PRSF 0.151 (0.028)***
Cross-level interactions
NEPNE 1.802 (0.875)*
BDI-IINE 0.145 (0.139)
RSQNE 0.043 (0.013)**
BDI-II PNE 0.202 (0.114)
RSQ PNE 0.010 (0.010)
Note. Analyses include 2459 occasions. Model includes linear and quadratic effects of
time of day, and linear effect of day. Asterisks indicate that the coefﬁcient differs
signiﬁcantly from 0. BDI-II¼ Beck Depression Inventory-II, RSQ¼ Ruminative Re-
sponse Scale (total score), NEP¼ proportion of occasions on which a negative event
was reported, NE¼ negative event (reported at time t), PNE¼ prior negative event
(reported at time t 1), PRSF¼ prior ruminative self-focus (reported at time t 1).
*p< 0.05. **p< 0.01. ***p< 0.001.
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partially mediates the relationship between prior negative events
and momentary negative affect. The absence of evidence for an
interaction between prior negative events and ruminative self-
focus testiﬁes to the adverse consequences of ruminative thought
in many circumstances, and not only after stressful events (see
Moberly & Watkins, 2008). Our mediation analysis suggests that
one reasonwhy negative events are distressing in the short-term is
because they induce ruminative thinking, which itself has depres-
sogenic consequences (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). To
our knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst to have used online measures
with sufﬁcient temporal resolution to identify this role of rumi-
native self-focus in emotional reactivity after negative events.
We found that trait ruminators experienced greater negative
affect after negative events that were reported at the same occa-
sion. This result is congruent with Robinson and Alloy’s (2003)-3
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Fig. 1. Relationship between reported occurrence of a negative event and negative
affect (both reported at time t) for individuals scoring high (one SD above the mean)
and low (one SD below the mean) on trait rumination (RSQ). Negative affect is
a summed composite of the standardized ratings for individual items.ﬁnding that the combination of elevated trait rumination and
a stressful event is associated with increased distress. Trait
rumination did not interact with prior negative events to predict
subsequent negative affect, possibly because prior momentary
ruminative self-focus was already included in the model.
Interestingly, trait ruminators reported their negative events as
more severe than other individuals did, even after controlling for
depressive symptomatology. Though a ruminative tendency may
make negative events seem worse, interpretation of this ﬁnding is
complicated by the possibility that event severity judgments were
inﬂuenced by the elevated levels of negative affect that high
ruminators recorded when the negative event was reported.
Replicating Swendson’s (1998) results, we found no evidence
that dysphoric individuals were especially reactive to negative
events. In fact, when internal events were excluded, dysphoric
persons were less reactive to prior negative events than others.
Peeters et al. (2003) found that clinically depressed participants
were less reactive than non-depressed controls immediately after
negative events, but were more reactive to negative events that
occurred at the previous sampling occasion. Relatedly, laboratory
studies have found that depressed individuals show reduced
emotional reactivity to personally relevant negative material
(Rottenberg, 2005).
Although negative event frequency was not uniquely associated
with negative affect, participants with more depressive symptoms
reported more frequent negative events, replicating diary studies
with non-clinical samples (e.g., Grosscup & Lewinsohn, 1980). In-
terestingly, individuals reporting a high frequency of negative
events were also less reactive to these events. This is unlikely to be
due to more liberal event-reporting criteria, because frequency and
mean event severity were not signiﬁcantly correlated. Though re-
quiring replication, this ﬁnding suggests that emotional response
may become desensitized after repeated negative life events.
This study has several limitations. First, the sample consisted
mainly of undergraduates, who may differ from other adults in the
events they experience and their reaction to these events. Second,
the demanding ESM protocol means that our volunteers may have
been more conscientious and self-focused than the wider
population (Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003). Advertising the
study as relevant to depression is likely to have resulted in
volunteers with more depressive symptoms than randomly
selected individuals. However, because it is debatable whether
clinical depression differs dimensionally or categorically from
non-clinical depression (Flett, Vredenburg, & Krames, 1997), it is
unclear whether our ﬁndings would generalize to a clinically
depressed sample.
Other concerns relate to the adequacy of our experience-sam-
pling procedure. To minimise participant burden over repeated
assessment, we used only three items to measure negative affect
and two items to measure ruminative self-focus. Although the
composites demonstrated acceptable internal consistency and
validity (see Moberly & Watkins, 2008), future research would
ideally use a more comprehensive set of items to capture these
constructs, within the constraints of ESM. Excluding occasions
when participants failed to respond within 15 minutes may have
resulted in an under-representation of certain everyday situations
(e.g., driving). Relatedly, we could not verify participants’ reports of
when the experience-sampling formwas completed. ‘Backﬁlling’ is
relatively common in diary and experience-sampling studies
(Stone, Shiffman, Schwartz, Broderick, & Hufford, 2002). Future
studies could use electronic personal data assistants to record the
time of data entry more precisely.
Because participants recorded negative events after rating their
negative affect, concurrent associations between these variables
cannot establish that negative events caused negative affect.
Nevertheless, our ﬁnding that prior negative events predicted
N.J. Moberly, E.R. Watkins / Behaviour Research and Therapy 46 (2008) 1034–1039 1039subsequent negative affect does suggest that negative events have
a prospective inﬂuence on negative affect. Finally, our multilevel
analysis prevented us from controlling for prior levels of negative
affect. Although we designed our composite measure of ruminative
self-focus to be independent of negative affect, it is possible that the
inﬂuence of prior ruminative self-focus was overestimated.
Our study provides further support for Nolen-Hoeksema’s
(1991) RST in relation to everyday stressful events. Momentary
ruminative self-focus partially mediated the association between
prior negative events and negative affect, while trait rumination
moderated the association between negative life events and neg-
ative affect. By developing our understanding of mood regulation in
an ecologically valid setting, we hope these results will contribute
to the development of therapeutic approaches that improve
psychological resilience.Acknowledgements
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